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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. government historically has had broad authority to 
conduct foreign surveillance without a warrant to obtain information1 
to protect against national security threats.2  However, the recent 
September 11, 2001 attacks have forced the government to recognize 
that threats to national security can and do occur from within the 
United States.3  Thus, on occasion, the President has sanctioned 
domestic surveillance.4 
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 1. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that “all the 
other courts to have decided the issue, held that the President did have inherent authority to 
conduct warrantless searches to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . .  We take for 
granted that the President does have that authority [to conduct warrantless searches for foreign 
intelligence purposes].”). 
 2. Id.; Susan Page, NSA Secret Database Report Triggers Fierce Debate in Washington, 
USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-
11-nsa-reax_x.htm [hereinafter Page, NSA Secret Database]; Richard A. Posner, Editorial, Our 
Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at A31. 
 3. See Leslie Cauley, NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone calls, USA TODAY, 
May 11, 2006, at 1A; Robert Block & Jay Solomon, Pentagon Steps Up Intelligence Efforts 
Inside U.S. Borders, CANDIDE’S NOTEBOOKS, Apr. 27, 2006, at A1, available at 
http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/library/wf-178.htm. 
 4. Dan Eggen, Bush Authorized Domestic Spying, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 
(eavesdropping on domestic calls since 2002); Eric Lichtblau, Bank Data Secretly Reviewed by 
U.S. to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A1. 
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In May 2006, USA TODAY reported that the National Security 
Agency (NSA) had created a database containing “tens of millions”5 
of domestic call records6 obtained from various telecommunication 
providers.7  The NSA then datamined8 the records to detect possible 
terrorist threats against national security.9  This Note analyzes the 
legality of the NSA call database.10 
First, Part I discusses the factual background surrounding the 
NSA call database and the response from the President and the 
public.  Part II looks at whether the government can legally collect 
call records without a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) and Pen Register Statute or alternatively 
using a National Security Letter (NSL).  Part II also examines the 
telecommunication providers’ liability under the 1996 
 
 5. John Diamond & Leslie Cauley, Pre-9/11 Records Help Flag Suspicious Calling, USA 
TODAY, May 22, 2006, at 6A.  However, it has been alleged that the NSA has access to an 
AT&T call database containing 1.9 trillion call records.  John Markoff, Taking Snooping 
Further: Government Looks at Ways to Mine Databases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at C1.  
Relatively speaking, the 1.9 trillion call record database is small compared to some corporate 
databases such as Wal-Mart’s.  Kevin Maney, Size of NSA’s Database of Phone-Call Records 
isn’t All That Impressive, USA TODAY, May 16, 2006, at 3B. 
 6. Call records “are the electronic information that is logged automatically each time a 
call is initiated.  For more than 20 years, local and long-distance companies have used call . . . 
records to figure out how much to charge each other for handling calls and to determine 
problems with equipment.”  Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5. 
 7. Cauley, supra note 3. 
 8. Datamining is defined as “the process of collecting large amounts of data from different 
sources . . . then searching for patterns within the data using computerized tools . . . with the 
goal of identifying significant relationships and predicting future trends and events.”  Matthew 
B. Stannard, U.S. Phone-Call Database Ignites Privacy Uproar, S.F. CHRON., May 12, 2006, at 
A1; Laura K. Donohue, Criminal Law: Anglo-American Privacy And Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1144-45 (finding that the U.S. government has previously engaged in 
199 datamining operations for various reasons “such as improving services, managing human 
resources, and detecting terrorist activity”). 
 9. Cauley, supra note 3. 
 10. For a preliminary analysis of some of the legal issues discussed in this Note see Posting 
of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/05/further-thoughts-on-
lawfulness-of.html (May 11, 2006, 10:08 PM); OrinKerr.com, More Thoughts on the Legality of 
the NSA Call Records Program, http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/05/12/more-thoughts-on-the-
legality-of-the-nsa-call-records-program/ (May 12, 2006, 3:30 AM) [hereinafter Kerr, More 
Thoughts]; Posting of Kate Martin to ACS Blog, http://www.acsblog.org/bill-of-rights-guest-
blogger-nsa-again-violates-the-law.html (May 11, 2006 4:26 PM); Posting of Orin Kerr to The 
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1147361955.shtml (May 11, 2006, 12:13 PM) 
[hereinafter Kerr, Thoughts]; CTR.  FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ILLEGAL NSA DATA MINING 
HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (2006), http://www.cdt.org/ 
publications/policyposts/2006/8; The Online Newshour, Legality of NSA Phone Program 
Questioned, PBS, May 12, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june06/privacy_05-
12.html. 
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Telecommunications Act and 1986 Store Communications Act for 
voluntarily disclosing the records to the government. 
Part III then asks whether datamining the obtained call records 
would constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Part IV discusses possible defenses available to the 
government, such as the state secrets privilege and the President’s 
authority (express and inherent) to bypass FISA.  In Part V, the 
analysis shifts to the international stage and whether the NSA call 
database would be legal in Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia, each of which strike a different balance between privacy 
rights and national security concerning the collecting and mining of 
call records than the United States. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
On May 10, 2006, USA TODAY published a story alleging11 that 
the NSA had created a secret12 database containing “tens of 
millions”13 of domestic call records with information such as the 
duration, date, and time of the call, and the caller and recipient’s 
phone numbers.14  However, the NSA’s database neither contained 
the content of the call nor the customer’s name or address.15  The 
NSA, without a warrant, allegedly obtained the phone records from 
telecommunication providers such as AT&T and MCI16 by setting up 
a “real time”17 direct connection from the phone providers to the 
 
 11. Susan Page, Lawmakers: NSA Database Incomplete, USA TODAY, June 30, 2006, at 
2A [hereinafter Page, Lawmakers] (stating that President Bush has not “directly confirmed” the 
existence of the call database). 
 12. Page, NSA Secret Database, supra note 2.  President Bush has stated that “appropriate 
members of Congress, both Republican and Democrat” were briefed about the program.  Id.  
However, one member of Congress said “she hadn’t been told all of the information included in 
the USA TODAY story.  And all but a handful of lawmakers learned of the program for the 
first time in the news account.”  Id. 
 13. See supra note 5. 
 14. Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5 (stating that the NSA acquired the “number from 
which a call [was] made, . . . the number called; the route a call took to reach its final 
destination; the time, date and place where a call started and ended; and  the duration of the 
call.  The records also note whether the call was placed from a cellphone or from a traditional 
‘land line.’”). 
 15. Page, Lawmakers, supra note 11. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Seymour M. Hersh, National Security Dept. Listening In, THE NEW YORKER, May 22, 
2006, at 24 (stating that “[t]he N.S.A. is getting real-time actionable intelligence”).  See also 
Texas A&M Glossary of Distance Education Terms, http://www.tamu.edu/ode/glossary.html 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2006) (defining “real time” as “[a]n application in which information is 
received and immediately responded to without any time delay”). 
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NSA headquarters.18  One carrier, Qwest, allegedly refused to grant 
the government access, citing concerns about the legality of the 
program without a warrant,19 about who would have access to this 
data,20 and how it would be used.21 
After creating the database, the NSA allegedly datamined the 
call records for patterns or trends22 of possible threats against national 
security.23  For example, the NSA computers would flag calls to the 
United States coming from countries in the Middle East if the person 
receiving the call subsequently made a domestic call.24  The NSA 
would then connect the flagged numbers to known phone numbers 
linked to terrorist activity.25  After datamining the records, it is 
alleged that the NSA plans to keep the data indefinitely.26 
President Bush has neither directly confirmed nor denied the 
existence of the NSA call database program.27  However, President 
Bush has stated, in defending the wiretapping of international calls, 
that “one end of the [phone] communication must be outside the 
 
 18. Hersh, supra note 17 (stating that the telecommunication provider would setup a “high-
speed circuit between its main computer complex and . . . [the] government-intelligence 
computer center”); Stephen Lawson, Documents in AT&T Spying Case Unsealed, MACWORLD, 
May 29, 2006, http://prisonplanet.com/articles/may2006/290506Documents.htm. 
 19. Cauley, supra note 3. 
 20. Id. (stating, “The NSA told Qwest that other government agencies, including the  FBI, 
CIA and DEA, also might have access to the database . . . . The NSA regularly shares its 
information—known as ‘product’ in intelligence circles—with other intelligence groups.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Alternatively, the call records could be used to assist in a wide range of investigations, 
such as by the police or government intelligence agencies.  The NSA’s New New Phone 
Database, http://www.radioopensource.org/the-nsas-new-new-phone-database/ (last visited Jan. 
2, 2007).  For example, assume the government believes that person X is a threat to national 
security.  Instead of having to obtain a subpoena to get that person’s phone records, the NSA 
could simply look up the person’s name in the phone book or through other means, and obtain 
the person’s number Y.  Once the number Y is obtained, a government agency could then 
search the NSA call database for all calls made “to” and “from” that number Y.  Moreover, the 
NSA is allegedly obtaining the real time data and the location of the call.  See Diamond & 
Cauley, supra note 5.  Thus, it could pinpoint a person’s whereabouts in a matter of seconds 
after the call is made.  See Velcro, Officials Spy on Calls, 
http://www.whatever.net.au/pipermail/velcro/2002-May/000090.html (May 1, 2002 16:30). 
 23. Cauley, supra note 3. 
 24. Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5. 
 25. Id. 
 26. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 10. 
 27. See Page, Lawmakers, supra note 11; see also Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 
974, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that the “court notes that despite many public reports . . . the 
government . . . has never publicly disclosed whether the NSA program reported by USA Today 
on May 11, 2006, actually exists”) (emphasis added). 
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United States,”28 leading most people to believe that only 
international calls—not domestic calls—were susceptible to 
surveillance.29 
In addition to the President’s response to the call database, the 
public has responded via public opinion polls and lawsuits.  A USA 
TODAY/Gallup poll found that fifty-one percent of Americans 
disapprove of the program.30  USA TODAY has also reported that as 
many as twenty class-action lawsuits have been filed in federal court 
against the government and telecommunication providers.31 
II.  DID THE NSA OBTAIN THE CALL RECORDS LEGALLY? 
A. Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act 
In 1975, a Congressional examination revealed that for at least 
twenty years the NSA had been intercepting international 
communications without a warrant at the request of various 
government agencies.32  This revelation prompted the 1978 enactment 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),33 which outlines 
the procedures that the government must follow to conduct electronic 
surveillance with or without a warrant.34 
1. Electronic Surveillance.  The first legal question is whether 
the acquisition of call records constitutes “electronic surveillance,” 
 
 28. Cauley, supra note 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Susan Page, Poll: 51% Oppose NSA Database, USA TODAY, May 14, 2006, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-14-nsa-reax-poll_x.htm?POE=NEWISVA 
[hereinafter Page, Poll].  Two other polls have been taken by Newsweek and The Washington 
Post.  David Jefferson, Newsweek Poll: Americans Wary of NSA Spying Bush’s Approval 
Ratings hit new lows as Controversy Rages, MSNBC, May 14, 2006, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12771821/site/newsweek/ (finding that fifty-three percent of 
people think the NSA call database is objectionable); Washington Post-ABC News Poll, WASH. 
POST, May 12, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_ 
nsa_051206.htm (finding, in a poll taken before the USA TODAY/Gallup discussed in the text, 
that sixty-three percent consider the NSA call database  an acceptable method to investigate 
terrorism).  The USA TODAY/Gallup Poll may differ from the previous Washington Post poll 
in the way in which the question was asked, and additionally, the Gallup Poll includes more 
respondents and less margin of error.  Page, Poll, supra. 
 31. Page, Lawmakers, supra note 11. 
 32. Cauley, supra note 3. 
 33. 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-1829, 1841-1846, 1861-1862, 1871 (LexisNexis 2006); see 
also Page, Lawmakers, supra note 11. 
 34. See Cauley, supra note 3; 50 U.S.C.S. § 1805(a) (LexisNexis 2006); 50 U.S.C.S. § 
1802(a)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2004). 
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which is defined35 in § 1801(f)(1) as “the acquisition by an 
electronic . . . device . . . of the contents of any wire . . . sent by . . . a 
particular, known United States person who is in the United States.”36  
Section 1801(n) defines “contents” as “any information concerning 
the identity of the parties to such communication or the existence, 
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.”37  Thus, § 
1801(n) broad definition covers more than merely the contents of a 
phone call and extends to the existence of the communication.38 
Implicit in this definition of “electronic surveillance” is that the 
acquisition must occur in real time.  In other words, the collection of 
historical records would not likely constitute “electronic 
surveillance.”39  The NSA is probably obtaining real time call records40 
as “[i]t does them no good to have [the telecommunication providers] 
back up the truck and unload the tapes. It needs a live feed from the 
server.”41  While it is true that the call records are missing customer 
identifiable information, such as the caller’s name, the NSA could 
cross-reference those records in a matter of seconds to identify the 
persons to the communication.  The fact that an extra step is required 
 
 35. The Senate Judiciary Committee (by a ten to eight vote) approved the National 
Security Surveillance Act of 2006 (also known as Senate Bill 2453).  Source Watch, National 
Security Surveillance Act of 2006, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=National_ 
Security_Surveillance_Act_of_2006 (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).  Senate Bill 2453 redefines, in § 
701(4), “electronic surveillance” to only require a warrant when the program captures the 
substance of the communication.  The Orator Network, S. 2453, http://www.theorator.com/ 
bills109/s2453.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).  Thus, the collection of call records by the NSA 
would probably not be considered electronic surveillance because the call records do not 
capture the substance of the communication.  It is questionable whether the bill will be passed 
because the Democrats currently have control over both Houses. 
 36. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(f)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added). 
 37. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(n) (LexisNexis 2006) (emphasis added). 
 38. Cf. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2510(8) (LexisNexis 2002) (defining “contents” for criminal 
interception of electronic communications as “any information concerning the substance, 
purport, or meaning of that communication”). 
 39. See Tom Brune, Bush under fire for phone taps, NEWS DAY, May 12, 2006, at A4 
(stating that “[r]eal-time collection of data would require the NSA to get a warrant . . . [under 
the FISA, but] if the NSA is collecting historical records, the telecommunications companies 
face [potential liability under a different Act]”); Bush Responds to USA TODAY Story 
Regarding NSA Database of Phone Calls, TECH L. J. (May 11, 2006), 
http://www.techlawjournal.com/topstories/2006/20060511b.asp (distinguishing between real time 
and non-real time collection of data in analyzing the government’s potential liability under 
FISA). 
 40. Hersh, supra note 17. 
 41. William Arkin et al., Bush Defends Spying After NSA Database Report, MSNBC, May 
11, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12734870/page/3/. 
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to identify the person should not allow the government to bypass 
FISA. 
Notwithstanding that the call records do not identify the parties 
to the communication, the call records do prove that a 
communication took place and thus would confirm the “existence” of 
the communication in § 1801(n); accordingly, the NSA would be 
acquiring “contents” in § 1801(f)(1) and therefore conducting 
electronic surveillance within the meaning of FISA. 
2. FISA Procedures.  Even if the government is conducting 
electronic surveillance, FISA provides two possible procedures that 
could permit the surveillance.  The first procedure42 is not important 
from a legal perspective, as the NSA did not seek a warrant for the 
acquisition of call records.43  But the decision is perplexing from a 
strategic perspective, as only five applications out of nineteen 
thousand have been refused by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court44 and the government’s submission is ex parte.45  The 
government most likely did not follow the first procedure, for it 
believed that the court would not approve a program of the size and 
scope of the NSA call database.46  When it was enacted, FISA did not 
contemplate a program like the call database, which involves millions 
of people and possibly thousands of targets.47  Moreover, the Bush 
administration finds the procedures of FISA too slow to react to the 
threat of terrorism.48 
In addition to proceeding with a warrant, the President can 
conduct electronic surveillance without a warrant for one year, 
provided three conditions are met.49  First, the electronic surveillance 
 
 42. See 50 U.S.C.S. § 1805(a) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring five conditions be met to obtain 
a warrant for conducting electronic surveillance). 
 43. See background discussion supra Part I. 
 44. Electronic Frontier Foundation, ATT-NSA FAQ, http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/ 
faq.php (last visited Dec. 13, 2006). 
 45. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1805(a) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 46. Page, NSA Secret Database, supra note 2; Cauley, supra note 3. 
 47. Posting of David Edwards to Veredictum, NSA Uses Private Firms for Massive 
Unchecked Domestic Surveillance, http://veredictum.com/node/109 (Feb. 27, 2006 12:44). 
 48. Cauley, supra note 3; Revising FISA to Address 21st Century Threats to National 
Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2d sess. (2006) (testimony by Robert D. Alt, Fellow, The 
John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs); Mort Kondracke, NSA Data Mining Is Legal, 
Necessary, Sec. Chertoff Says, REAL CLEAR POL., Jan. 20, 2006, http://www.realclear 
politics.com/Commentary/com-1_20_06_MK.html. 
 49. See 50 U.S.C.S. § 1802 (LexisNexis 2004). 
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must involve acquiring the “content of the communication” between 
foreign powers.50  Second, the surveillance cannot “acquire the 
contents of any communication to which a United States person51 is a 
party.”52  Finally, the surveillance must meet the “minimization 
procedures” defined in § 1801(h).53  Under the first prong, it is 
unlikely that millions of people would be considered a foreign power.  
Next, and most important, the government appears to be acquiring 
the “contents” of a communication to which a citizen of United States 
is a party.  Finally, prong three is unlikely to succeed because it is 
doubtful that the scope of the program meets the “minimization 
procedures”54 required by FISA. 
B. Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices 
A pen register55 records all the phone numbers dialed from a 
particular telephone, and a trap and trace device56 records all numbers 
that dial a specific phone number.57  There are two statutes that allow 
the use of a pen register or trap and trace device provided certain 
conditions are met. 
Under the first statute, FISA,58 these devices can only be used if 
the Attorney General certifies that “information likely . . . is relevant 
to an ongoing investigation to protect against international 
terrorism . . . provided that such investigation of a United States 
person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected 
by the first amendment to the Constitution.”59  This statute is unlikely 
 
 50. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1802(a)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2004). 
 51. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(i) (LexisNexis 2006) (defining a “‘United States person’ . . . [as] a 
citizen . . . an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resident” and corporations incorporated in 
the United States). 
 52. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1802(a)(1)(B) (LexisNexis 2004) (emphasis added). 
 53. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(h) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 54. Id. (stating, in part, the government is required “to minimize the acquisition and 
retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning 
unconsenting United States persons”). 
 55. A “pen register” is defined as “a device or process which records . . . dialing . . . 
information transmitted by an instrument.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 3127(3) (LexisNexis 2001); 50 U.S.C. 
§1841(2) (2000). 
 56. A “trap and trace device” is “a device or process which captures the incoming 
electronic . . . impulses which identify the originating number.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 3127(4) 
(LexisNexis 2001); 50 U.S.C. §1841(2) (2000). 
 57. Everything2, NSA phone record database, http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_ 
id=1807359 (May 17, 2006, 6:38). 
 58. 50 U.S.C.S. §§1841-1846 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 59. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1842(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2006). 
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to apply because the acquisition of millions of records would not 
likely be relevant to an ongoing investigation; the government would 
not know if a person was a terrorist threat until it obtained the 
records and performed the necessary analysis. 
The second statute, the criminal pen register,60 prohibits both the 
use of a pen register or trap and trace device unless the court 
approves the device or an exception applies.61  The 
telecommunication providers can use either device to obtain the call 
records under the operation and maintenance exception,62 such as 
billing.  However, if the NSA is obtaining real time call records from 
the phone providers, then it would be using the same device as the 
telecommunication providers, yet not meeting any of the exceptions 
such as maintenance and operation. 
Alternatively, if the NSA did not acquire the call records in real 
time, it could be argued that the telecommunication providers legally 
collected the call records and then the NSA obtained these records 
without using any devices.63  However, that argument would render 
the pen register statute meaningless,64 as the NSA could circumvent 
the statute and obtain all the same information (such as phone 
numbers) that they would normally acquire through either the pen 
register and/or trap and trace device.  Thus, it is difficult to reconcile 
how it is legal to acquire pen register information without a court 
order through the telecommunication providers, yet it is illegal to use 
a pen register without a court order to obtain the same information.65 
C. National Security Letter as an Alternative to FISA 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 2709, also known as the National Security 
Letter (NSL), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) can obtain66 
 
 60. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 3121-3127 (LexisNexis 2002). 
 61. 18 U.S.C.S. § 3121(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2001). 
 62. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 3121(b) (LexisNexis 2001). 
 63. See Kerr, Thoughts, supra note 10. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Legal Issues Governing the Administration’s Newly Disclosed Surveillance Program, 
Unclaimed Territory, http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/05/legal-issues-governing-
administrations.html (May 11, 2006, 1:34). 
 66. The FBI is issuing more than thirty thousand NSLs per year.  Robyn E. Blumner, 
National Security Letters Put Privacy at Risk, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at 5P; 
Christopher P. Raab, iBrief,  Fighting Terrorism in an Electronic Age: Does the PATRIOT Act 
Unduly Compromise Our Civil Liberties?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0003 ¶ 26 (2006) 
(stating that “the FBI issues more than 30,000 NSLs yearly, a number that the Justice 
Department would neither confirm nor deny”). 
05__MACARTHUR.DOC 10/4/2007  9:55:02 AM 
450 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:441 
records without a warrant if the “records sought are relevant to an 
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism.”67  
Further, the recipient of an NSL is prohibited from disclosing the fact 
that the government made the request.68 
An interesting legal issue is whether the NSA could have the FBI 
obtain the call records using a NSL and then share69 that information 
with the NSA, thus avoiding the requirements of FISA.70  The answer 
is likely no.  The FBI usually conducts targeted investigations of 
individual suspects based on known facts.71  Thus, Congress did not 
contemplate giving the FBI authority to make broad, 
indistinguishable requests for numerous records without any 
individualized suspicion.72  Section 2709(b)(1) prohibits any 
investigation based on activities protected by the First Amendment;73 
the collection of phone records could be seen as violating that clause 
because the NSA is collecting data based on phone conversations.74  
Finally, an NSL “is an administrative subpoena,”75 meaning that the 
subpoena must be relevant, limited, and specific enough to avoid 
being too burdensome.76  The request by the FBI for the call records 
would not meet any of these conditions because the request would be 
for all call records without any suspicion of terrorist activity. 
D. Telecommunication Providers’ Liability 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act states that “[e]very 
telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the confidentiality of 
proprietary information. . . relating to . . . customers.”77  This 
customer proprietary network information (CPNI) has been defined 
 
 67. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 68. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(c) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 69. Cauley, supra note 3. 
 70. The FBI could also use something similar to an NSL called the “library records 
provision” (LRP) under 50 U.S.C.S. § 1861 (LexisNexis 2006). Blumner, supra note 66.  In 
contrast to the NSL, which does not require any judicial oversight, the LRP would require ex 
parte court approval before any records could be obtained.  50 U.S.C.S. § 1861(c) (LexisNexis 
2006).  Thus, the LRP requires at least one more step before any records can be acquired. 
 71. Martin, supra note 10. 
 72. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that the FBI can obtain 
records “of a person [not millions of persons] or entity”) (emphasis added). 
 73. See 18 U.S.C.S. § 2709(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
 74. Lederman, supra note 10. 
 75. Doe I v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 417 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 76. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984); see Lederman, supra note 10. 
 77. 47 U.S.C. § 222(a) (2000). 
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as “information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, 
type, destination, and amount of use of a telecommunications service 
subscribed to by any customer.”78 
The first question is whether the call records’ details, such as 
duration, timing, and phone numbers,79 acquired by the NSA 
constitute CPNI.  The Federal Communications Commission has 
recently stated that “CPNI includes information such as the phone 
numbers called by a consumer; the frequency, duration, and timing of 
such calls; and any services purchased by the consumer, such as call 
waiting.  CPNI therefore includes highly-sensitive personal 
information.”80  Thus, it is likely that the telecommunication providers 
were prohibited from disclosing the call records to the government 
unless the customer consented, required by law,81 related to billing, to 
prevent fraud, and one of a few other exceptions was present.82 
The government could argue that the consumer has consented83 
to the disclosure through the standard phone contract or 
alternatively, that the government coerced the phone providers to 
supply those records.84  The problem with the first argument is that 
any disclosure provision in the contract would likely be voided based 
on public policy concerns or violating the spirit of the 
Telecommunications Act.  Further, according to 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007, 
a customer can always revoke his or her approval,85 and this would be 
likely once the customer learns how his or her information is being 
used.  The second argument is weaker as it appears the 
 
 78. 47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1)(A) (2000); Leah E. Capritta, Tenth Circuit Survey: 
Communications Law: U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC Interprets the First Amendment Ramifications of 
“Customer Proprietary Network Information,” 77 DENV. U.L. REV. 441, 442 (2000) (quoting 
California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir. 1994)) (stating that “CPNI is information about a 
telephone customer’s use of the telephone network, such as the number of lines ordered, service 
location, type and class of services purchased, usage levels, and calling patterns”). 
 79. Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5. 
 80. In Re Telecommunications Act of 1996, 21 FCC Rcd 1782, 1784 (2006) (emphasis 
added). 
 81. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2000). 
 82. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(d)(1)-(4) (2000). 
 83. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007(a) (2007) (stating that a phone provider can obtain customer 
consent to use customer proprietary network information “through written, oral or electronic 
methods”). 
 84. Talk Left, NSA Phone Records: What’s the Problem?, http://www.talkleft.com/story/ 
2006/05/13/892/21491 (May 13, 2006, 12:16:07 PM EST). 
 85. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007(a)(2) (2007). 
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telecommunication providers had a voluntary agreement with the 
government.86 
In addition to the Telecommunications Act, the 1986 Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2702) states that 
“a provider of remote computing service or electronic 
communication87 . . . shall not knowingly divulge a record . . . 
pertaining to a subscriber . . . to any governmental entity.”88  There 
are six potential exceptions in § 2702(c), including consent by the 
customer and emergency (death or serious injury).89  Before 
addressing consent, it is unlikely that the disclosure of call records is 
necessary to avoid immediate death or serious injury90 as the call 
database was enacted to identify future terrorist threats. 
The consent exception is not likely to succeed because the First 
Circuit, in construing consent in an analogous statute,91 gave it a 
narrow meaning.  The court “emphasize[d] that ‘consent should not 
 
 86. See background discussion supra Part I. 
 87. It may be possible to argue that the telecommunication providers are long-distance 
carriers and thus not providers of electronic communication service as defined in § 2510(15).  
OrinKerr.com, New Facts Suggest A Possible Reason Why the Phone Companies May Not Be 
Liable For the NSA Call Records Program, http://www.orinkerr.com/2006/05/18/new-facts-
suggest-a-possible-reason-why-the-phone-companies-may-not-be-liable-for-the-nsa-call-
records-program (May 18, 2006, 1:30 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, New Facts]. 
 88. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2702(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006).  Section 2702(a)(1) and (a)(2) do not apply 
because the telecommunication provider is not disclosing “contents.”  Section 2711 states, “As 
used in this chapter . . . the terms defined in § 2510 of this title . . . have, respectively, the 
definitions given such terms in that section.”  18 U.S.C.S. § 2711(1) (LexisNexis 2006).  Section 
2510 defines “contents” as any “electronic communication . . . concerning the substance, 
purport, or meaning of that communication.”  18 U.S.C.S. § 2510 (LexisNexis 2002).  Thus, call 
records’ details would likely not fit within this definition because the phone conversation 
contents are not being transferred to the NSA. 
 89. Disclosure is also permitted when (1) authorized by § 2703; (2) a necessary part of 
service; (3) “connection with a report submitted thereto under section 227 of the Victims of 
Child Abuse Act of 1990”; (4) any person not a government entity. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2702(c) 
(LexisNexis 2006).  The only possible disclosure exception that could apply is the “authorized 
by section 2703” exception.  Section 2703(c) permits disclosure when the government obtains a 
warrant, obtains a court order, obtains consent, is enforceing laws against telemarketing fraud, 
or is using an administrative subpoena.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (LexisNexis 2006).  It is unlikely 
that § 2703’s first four exceptions apply.  As for its fifth exception, it is also unlikely as the NSA 
might not have administrative subpoena power and even if it did, there is no evidence that it was 
issued.  Imjtk, Your Telco owes you $1,000, http://imjtk.com/your-telco-owes-you-1000.php 
(May 14, 2006); see generally, Lederman, supra note 10 (stating that “there appears to have been 
no such administrative subpoena here”). 
 90. Kerr, Thoughts, supra note 10. 
 91. Id. (stating, “There are no cases interpreting [exactly] . . . what consent means in 
2702(c)(2), but like many of the exceptions in the SCA it is clearly a copy of an analogous 
exception in the close cousin of the SCA, the federal Wiretap Act . . . .”). 
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casually be inferred,’ . . . particularly in a case of deficient notice.  The 
surrounding circumstances must convincingly show that the party 
knew about and consented to the interception in spite of the lack of 
formal notice or deficient formal notice.”92  Thus, because the 
customers likely had no notice of the transfer of call records, it is 
doubtful that the customers consented to the records being disclosed 
by the phone providers. 
Even if the government applied for a court order after obtaining 
the records without meeting one of the exceptions to validate the 
transfer, it is likely that the request would be denied.93  In one case, a 
carrier provided the government with records voluntarily and the 
government then applied for a court order afterwards to retroactively 
validate the transfer.94  In denying the government’s request for an 
order, the court held that the government was required to obtain an 
order before the telecommunication provider disclosed the records. 95 
Finally, an argument could be made that the SCA only prohibits 
the disclosure of stored records as opposed to records acquired in real 
time.96  A Federal District Court noted, “As implied by its full title 
(‘Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional 
Records Access’), the entire focus of the SCA is [on] . . . existing 
communications . . . .”97  This conclusion is based on that fact that 
there are procedural protections in other statutes permitting real time 
surveillance that are absent in the SCA.98  Unlike both the Pen 
Register Statute and Wiretap Act, the SCA’s law enforcement 
 
 92. United States v. Lanoue, 71 F.3d 966, 981 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 
 93. See In re Application of U.S. For a Nunc Pro Tunc Order For Disclosure of 
Telecommunications Records, 352 F.Supp.2d 45 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 94. Id. at 46. 
 95. See id. 
 96. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a 
Pen Register and a Caller Identification Sys. on Tele. Nos. [sealed] and [sealed] and the Prod. of 
Real Time Cell Site Info., 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D. Md. 2005); In re Application of the U.S. 
for Orders Authorizing the Installation and Use of Pen Registers and Caller Identification 
Devices on Tel. Nos. [sealed] and [sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 (D. Md. 2006) (stating, “The 
structure of the SCA shows that the statute does not contemplate orders for prospective [or real 
time] information.”). 
 97. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a 
Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting In re Application for 
Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 760 
(S.D. Tex. 2005)) (emphasis added). 
 98. Id. (emphasis added); In re Orders Authorizing Pen Registers and Caller Identification 
Devices, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 395 n.7. (stating, “The SCA regulates access to records and 
communications in storage and therefore lacks provisions typical of prospective [or real time] 
surveillance statutes.”). 
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surveillance is not limited in length by a court order and the order is 
not required to be automatically sealed to maintain secrecy of the 
surveillance.99  Thus, if Congress intended the SCA to cover real time 
disclosure of records then it would have included in the SCA similar 
real time provisions.100 
In contrast, another court has found that because the SCA has no 
express limitation on the disclosure of real time data, that the SCA 
covers both the disclosure of stored and real-time records.101  
Moreover, even if the SCA only covers stored records, it is possible to 
argue that the records will be stored, if only briefly, by the phone 
providers before transferring those records to the NSA; accordingly, 
the phone providers would be violating the SCA by disclosing those 
stored records.102  The better-reasoned of the two arguments is that 
the real time disclosure of call records would not violate the SCA 
unless historical records were disclosed.  This is based on the fact that 
the SCA is missing the same structural characteristics as other real 
time statutes and a momentary storage of call records should not 
count as a stored record under the SCA. 
III.  DID THE GOVERNMENT VIOLATE THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT BY DATAMINING THE CALL RECORDS? 
The Fourth Amendment protects the “[t]he right of the 
people . . . against unreasonable searches.”103  A challenge based on 
the Fourth Amendment requires that a person can claim “a 
‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been 
invaded by government action.”104  The reasonable expectation of 
privacy analysis asks first, does the person have an actual (subjective) 
privacy expectation, and second, does society (objectively) consider 
the person’s privacy expectation reasonable.105  If the person meets 
both prongs of this test or establishes a legitimate privacy 
expectation, then the court must decide whether the intrusion is 
 
 99. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a 
Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 104. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate 
Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 61, 71 (1999-
2000). 
 105. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; Skok, supra note 104, at 71. 
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reasonable.106  The reasonableness of the search is based on the 
meaning of the Amendment at the time it was framed107 or, if that 
yields no result, through a balancing test that weighs the private 
interest against the government interest.108 
A. Prong One: Individual Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Both United States v. Miller109 and Smith v. Maryland,110 decided 
in a span of three years, indicate that a person does not have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in records that are voluntarily 
conveyed to a third-party.  In Miller, the issue was whether the 
government violated the Fourth Amendment by requiring a bank to 
copy and inspect a person’s records.111  The Court held that a person 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in information held by the 
third-party bank.112  Similarly, in Smith, the issue was whether the 
government had performed a search under the Fourth Amendment113 
when a phone company, at the government’s request, installed a pen 
register to record the numbers dialed.114  The Court held that the 
person had no privacy expectation in the dialed numbers because 
those numbers are necessarily conveyed to the phone providers.115 
However, Miller and Smith fail to consider how the Fourth 
Amendment has been altered over time with changing technology.  
For example, in Olmstead v. United States,116 the Court initially held 
that no warrant was required to tap a phone line,117 but later, in Katz 
v. United States,118 the Court held that public conversations monitored 
by the government violated the Fourth Amendment.119  The Katz 
approach could be viewed as “embrac[ing] whatever rules are needed 
 
 106. Skok, supra note 104, at 71. 
 107. Id. at 71-72. 
 108. Id. 
 109. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 110. 442 U.S. at 735. 
 111. Miller, 425 U.S. at 439-40. 
 112. See id. at 444-45. 
 113. Smith, 442 U.S. at 738. 
 114. Id. at 737. 
 115. Id. at 742. 
 116. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 117. Id. at 466 (holding that “the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search or 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). 
 118. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 119. Id. at 358-59. 
05__MACARTHUR.DOC 10/4/2007  9:55:02 AM 
456 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:441 
to protect privacy against new technologies.”120  Moreover, recently in 
Kyllo v. United States,121 the Court held that infrared searches of a 
person’s home violate the Fourth Amendment.122  However, Kyllo 
could be read as emphasizing the sanctity of a person’s home,123 rather 
than enhancing Fourth Amendment protections against new 
technologies.124  The Court did state, though, in Kyllo that “[i]t would 
be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by 
the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance 
of technology.”125  Thus, Katz and Kyllo could indicate that courts126 
will not ignore NSA’s technology searching capabilities, especially 
considering that the NSA has “the largest computing power 
concentrated at any one place in the whole world.”127 
Another possible argument against Miller and Smith is that after 
both cases were decided Congress enacted statutes to protect the 
privacy of the records in each case.  For example, after Miller and 
Smith were decided, Congress enacted The Right to Financial Privacy 
Act and Pen Register Act respectively.128  Moreover, since Miller and 
Smith were decided, Congress has enacted the 1996 
Telecommunications Act and 1986 Store Communications Act to 
 
 120. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and new Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 818 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Fourth Amendment]. 
 121. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 122. Id. at 40. 
 123. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536-
38 (2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Searches and Seizures]. 
 124. See Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 120, at 835; but see Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 
(stating that Fourth Amendment “considerations do not vanish when the search in question is 
transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of [an outside 
place] . . . . Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 125. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34. 
 126. Patricia L. Bellia, The Fourth Amendment and Emerging Communications 
Technologies, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, May/June 2006, at 20-28, available at 
http://www.computer.org/portal/site/security/menuitem.6f7b2414551cb84651286b108bcd45f3/ind
ex.jsp?&pName=security_level1_article&TheCat=1015&path=security/2006/v4n3&file=bellia.x
ml& (stating that “conclusions as to when an expectation of privacy is ‘reasonable,’ always 
difficult for judges to make, are especially difficult with evolving technologies”). 
 127. Edwards, supra note 47 (quoting James Risen, Tim Russert Show (CNBC television 
broadcast, February 25, 2006)) (emphasis added).  The Court in Kyllo based its holding, in part, 
on the fact the government used technology “not in general public use.”  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.  
Similarly, it is likely that the NSA has technology that is not publicly available to facilitate the 
searching of call records. 
 128. Kerr, Fourth Amendment, supra note 120, at 855; Fred H. Cate, Legal Standards for 
Data Mining, HUNTON & WILLIAMS 13 (August 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/1250/Cate_Fourth_Amendment.pdf. 
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protect customer phone records from unauthorized disclosure.129  
Thus, taken as a whole, these statutes enacted by Congress indicate 
that records released to a third-party have some constitutional 
privacy value. 
B. Prong Two: Societal Expectation of Privacy 
Even after establishing the first prong, society would still have to 
recognize the expectation as reasonable.  This second prong would 
face similar arguments as the first: namely, that society is not 
prepared to recognize a privacy right in information voluntarily 
disclosed to third parties.  However, unlike both Miller and Smith, 
here public opinion polls indicate that at least fifty-one percent of 
society objects to the call database.130  Also, at least twenty class-
action lawsuits have been filed against the government and 
telecommunication providers, demonstrating society’s displeasure 
with the disclosing and mining of call records.131  Thus, society may 
one day be willing to recognize a privacy expectation in third-party 
records that it was not prepared to recognize during the era of Miller 
and Smith. 
C. Reasonableness of the Search 
Some commentators believe that a computer cannot perform a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.132  Judge 
Richard Posner, for example, has stated that “processing of data 
cannot . . . invade privacy.  .  .  .  This initial sifting, far from invading 
privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most private data 
from being read by any intelligence officer.”133  Another leading 
Fourth Amendment scholar has advocated the “exposure-based 
approach,” in which data is not search until it “is exposed to human 
observation.”134 
 
 129. See generally, Lederman, supra note 10 (reasoning that “Smith v. Maryland is based on 
the idea that phone users do not have a legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy in who 
they call.  However, the fact that laws like the stored communications act . . . and other privacy 
laws now exist give people a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information”). 
 130. See background discussion supra Part I. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, Searches and Seizures in a Networked World, 119 
HARV. L. REV. F. 83 (2006). 
 133. Posner, supra note 2. 
 134. Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 123, at 547-48. 
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No perfect datamining program exists, and thus human eyes will 
eventually view the data, resulting in a search that implicates the 
Fourth Amendment.135  Additionally, in the binary world, the NSA 
could possibly perform a significant number of searches136 in what 
would take the police a lifetime to perform in the physical world.  
Moreover, unlike the physical world, where any search conducted 
would require probable cause,137 the binary world has no judicial 
oversight or statutory procedures to follow138 and consequently there 
is a greater chance for abuse of power.139  Further, unlike in the 
physical world, the person in the binary world would have no notice140 
that a search was even performed.141  Because there is no notice, a 
person could not deter the government through voting or political 
pressure or even “regulate their behaviour to avoid unwanted 
intrusions.”142  Thus, datamining should be considered a search and be 
examined for reasonableness by balancing the government and 
private interests.143  Mining a database so large lacks reasonableness 
 
 135. Zittrain, supra note 132, at 92. 
 136. See Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 123, at 534 (stating that “computer searches 
involve entire virtual worlds of information”). 
 137. United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 571 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 138. Zittrain, supra note 132, at 91. 
 139. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972); see also 4&20 
Blackbirds, Data Mining May be Legal—But is Still Repugnant, http://4and20blackbirds.word 
press.com/2006/05/12/data-mining-may-be-legal-but-is-still repugnant/ (May 12, 2006, 5:55) 
[hereinafter Blackbirds]. 
 140. In the physical world, even with a search warrant the police are required, in most cases, 
to “knock and announce” before entering a house.  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 
(1995); but see Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2006) (holding that violating the 
“knock and announce” rule will not result in the evidence being suppressed).  Thus, some notice 
is even required by officers before executing a search warrant on a home.  In contrast, the 
binary or digital world requires none even without a search warrant.  While it is true that the 
“knock and announce” rule is specific to the home, the purpose of the rule was to prevent 
destruction of property and avoid violence just like providing notice to owners of the call 
records could prevent the potential suspects from acting violently or destroying important 
evidence relating to national security.  Id. at 2165. 
 141. Zittrain, supra note 132, at 91-92; Blackbirds, supra note 139. 
 142. Gus Hosein et al., Invasive, Illusory, Illegal, and Illegitimate: Privacy International and 
EDRi Response to the Consultation on a Framework Decision on Data Retention, Privacy 
International, Sept. 15, 2004,  http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/terrorism/rpt/response 
toretention.html. 
 143. Reasonableness could not be determined based on when the Amendment was framed 
because computer searching did not exist when the Fourth Amendment was enacted.  Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. 47j v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)) (citations omitted) (“[W]here there was no clear 
practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the 
constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness 
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because it is inefficient, that is, many false positives are going to 
occur, resulting in innocent people being jailed or suffering 
reputational harm.144 
IV.  GOVERNMENT’S DEFENSES 
A. State Secrets Privilege 
The state secrets privilege is a rule of evidence that makes 
inadmissible any material detrimental to national security.145  The 
privilege can be invoked on two grounds.  First, if there is a covert 
espionage agreement with the government, then the court is 
categorically barred (also known as the Totten bar) from hearing the 
case.146  Second, if there is no categorical bar, then the court 
determines (1) if the state secrets privilege has been properly 
asserted, and (2) whether disclosure would be reasonably dangerous 
to national security.147 
The government is likely to argue that the Totten categorical bar 
applies and ends the judicial inquiry, but this argument is misplaced.  
The basis for this argument would be that the government and the 
phone providers have an agreement in place,148 analogous to a covert 
espionage agreement.  However, implicit in Totten was that one who 
makes a covert agreement agrees not to disclose the agreement, even 
if breached.149  But, any potential challenger to the NSA call database 
program would likely be a consumer who is not part of the 
government-phone provider agreement and thus would not be 
“bound by any implied covenant of secrecy.”150  Further, Totten is 
 
standard ‘is judged by balancing  its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”). 
 144. Stannard, supra note 8 (stating that “the problem with applying data mining techniques 
to terrorism . . . is that terrorism is so rare, and the databases being mined are so large, that false 
positives are inevitable and often more common than truly accurate results.  And unlike using 
data mining to spot credit card fraud, where at most a false positive triggers a worried call from 
Visa to a cardholder and perhaps a temporary suspension of the card’s use, a false positive in a 
terror investigation can put an innocent person in jail.”). 
 145. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp.2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 146. See id. at 980-81 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876)). 
 147. Id. at 981-82 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)). 
 148. See Cauley, supra note 3 (stating that “three telecommunications companies [AT&T, 
BellSouth, and Verizon] are working under contract with the NSA.”); but see Page, Lawmakers, 
supra note 11 (providing an update stating that “the newspaper cannot confirm that BellSouth 
or Verizon contracted with the NSA to provide bulk calling records to that database”). 
 149. Hepting, 439 F. Supp.2d at 991. 
 150. Id. at 991. 
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inapplicable here because it would result in the plaintiff’s case being 
dismissed “based solely on the government’s conclusory statements 
without any real judicial review.”151 
In contrast to the Totten categorical bar, the government can 
likely assert the state secrets privilege under the second ground, as 
both conditions are likely met.  It likely has asserted the privilege 
correctly,152 and there have been no public disclosures meaning that 
any future disclosures could potentially be dangerous to national 
security.153  The court in Hepting v. AT&T Corp.154 agreed that both 
conditions were met, and the privilege applies.  However, the court 
reluctantly reached this conclusion because NSA public disclosures 
about other security programs may have alerted any potential 
terrorists to the call database.155  In fact, the court even warned that if 
any public disclosures occurred accidentally or deliberately later on, 
then those disclosures might preclude the government from asserting 
the state secrets privilege.156 
B. The President’s Authority to Bypass FISA 
1. Government’s Arguments.  The President could first argue 
that he has express authority to override the FISA procedures and 
create the NSA call database.  Section 1809(a)(1) provides that any 
electronic surveillance “authorized by statute” is exempt from the 
FISA procedures.157  The Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF)158 could provide such authorization, as it states that the 
 
 151. Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp.2d  899, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see also Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) (stating, “Whatever power the United 
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with 
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches 
when individual liberties are at stake.”). 
 152. The Supreme Court has held that to properly assert the state secrets privilege there 
must be “[1] formal claims of privilege, [2] lodged by the head of the department which has 
control over the matter, [3] after actual personal consideration by that officer.”  United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).  All the requirements are likely to be met here. 
 153. See Hepting, 439 F. Supp.2d at 991, 997-98 (allowing the state secrets privilege based on 
the lack of any public disclosures); Terkel, 441 F. Supp.2d at 901 (stating that “there have been 
no public disclosures of the existence or non-existence” of the call database). 
 154. 439 F.Supp.2d at 991. 
 155. Id. at 997. 
 156. Id. at 991, 997-98. 
 157. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000). 
 158. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001).  Also see the joint resolution to authorize the use of military forces in Iraq, which states 
that the “President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines 
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President is to “use all necessary and appropriate force . . . to prevent 
any future acts of . . . terrorism against the United States.”159 
Secondly, the President could argue that the Supreme Court, in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,160 held that government action that is a 
“fundamental incident of waging war” is authorized by the AUMF’s 
“necessary and appropriate force” clause.161  Because intelligence 
gathering is a significant part of combat, the NSA’s collection and 
mining of call records to prevent terrorist threats would be authorized 
by the AUMF’s force clause.162  Third, and finally, it could also be 
argued that the Constitution provides the President with inherent 
authority to bypass FISA and create the NSA call database.163 
2. Analysis.  The first argument that the AUMF overrides 
FISA is not supported by FISA’s text, which states that FISA “shall 
be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . may be 
conducted.”164  One court has stated that the exclusivity language 
“makes it impossible for the President to ‘opt-out’ of the legislative 
scheme.”165  It is a settled canon of statutory interpretation that 
general provisions are superseded by specific provisions.166  FISA does 
not permit domestic electronic surveillance without a warrant, but the 
AUMF allows the President to use all “necessary and appropriate 
 
to be necessary and appropriate in order to . . .  defend the national security of the United States 
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” as another possible source of express congressional 
authority.  Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3, 116 Stat. 1498, 1501 (2002). 
 159. Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2. 
 160. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 161. Id. at 519; Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazen & Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative 
Attorneys, Cong. Research Serv., on Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic 
Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, (Jan. 5, 2006) (available at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/Eavesdropping/CRS%20report%20Jan%205%202006.pdf) 
[hereinafter Congressional Research Service]. 
 162. This type of authority could be called “modified-express” because the President would 
have express authority from Congress, but only for actions that are a “fundamental incident of 
waging war.” 
 163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1(stating that “the executive power shall be vested in a 
President”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (stating that “the President shall be Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy.”). 
 164. 18 U.S.C.S. §2511 (2)(f) (LexisNexis 2002) (emphasis added). 
 165. United States v. Andonian, 735 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d in part and 
remanded, 29 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995). 
 166. PresstheNews.Com, The NSA Wiretap Program Violates FISA, and the Constitution’s 
Separation of Powers Clauses, http://www.pressthenews.com/wt3.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2006) 
[hereinafter The NSA Wiretap Program]. 
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force.”167  Thus, it would take a strained reading to find that the 
AUMF’s general provision overrides FISA’s specific language168 
requiring a warrant for domestic surveillance.  Notwithstanding 
FISA’s text, it is unlikely that gathering and datamining numerous 
call records constitutes the “necessary and appropriate force” 
required to invoke the AUMF. 169 
Similarly, the second argument for Presidential authority, relying 
on Hamdi, is also misplaced.  While it is true that intelligence 
acquisition is an important part of any combat, “it is not clear that the 
collection of intelligence constitutes a use of force.”170  In Hamdi, the 
Court held that the AUMF authorized the detention of a United 
States citizen even though the Non-Detention Act provided that a 
United States citizen could not be detained unless Congress 
authorized it.171  Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality of the 
court, found that the AUMF does not support “indefinite detention 
for the purpose of interrogation.”172  Thus, the Court seemed to be 
indicating that intelligence gathering is not a necessary or appropriate 
force.  Accordingly, because the NSA call database is for intelligence 
purposes, it would likely not constitute the use of force authorized by 
the AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force” clause. 
Third, the argument that the President has inherent authority is 
also unlikely to succeed.  When President Carter signed FISA into 
law, he stated that the bill “clarifie[d] the Executive’s authority to 
gather foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance in the United 
States.”173  Thus, even the President responsible for approving FISA 
acknowledged that FISA limits the President’s authority to conduct 
electronic surveillance.174  While it could be argued that the 
President’s authority is heightened during a time of conflict, the 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 161. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). 
 172. See id. at 521. 
 173. Letter from the Ctr. For Constitutional Rights to the Senate Intelligence Comm. (May 
17, 2006) (available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID=5hgZvLHaDC& 
Content=776). 
 174. Additionally, it could be argued that when Congress amended FISA in 2001, a month 
after the AUMF was adopted, it implicitly recognized that the AUMF does not bypass FISA.  
Posting by Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1135029722.shtml 
(Dec. 19, 2005, 4:02 PM) [hereinafter Kerr, Legal Analysis]; The NSA Wiretap Program, supra 
note 166. 
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Court in Hamdi stated that “a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President” and that all three branches should be involved when civil 
liberties are at stake.175  Thus, Hamdi indicated that the President’s 
inherent authority is circumscribed even during a time of war. 
V.  WOULD THE CALL DATABASE BE LEGAL IN CANADA, 
THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND AUSTRALIA? 
An analysis of the NSA call database under Canadian, British, 
and Australian law could provide176 insight into American law and 
how to improve it,177 especially considering the degree to which 
privacy rights vary from country to country.178  For example, Privacy 
International, a privacy watchdog group,179 ranked Canada as having 
“significant protections and safeguards.”180  It ranked Australia and 
the United Kingdom as having “systemic failure to uphold 
safeguards” and an “endemic surveillance societ[y],” respectively,181 
while the United States received an “[e]xtensive surveillance 
societ[y]” ranking.  This indicates that much can be learned by 
evaluating the collection and mining of call records and the balances 
 
 175. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. 
 176. One scholar has evaluated the NSA call database, in general, under both German and 
French law and concluded that the NSA call database would be illegal in both countries.  This 
conclusion was based, in part, on the fact that (1) the government would have access to a 
significant amount of data; (2) the government would hold the data for a long period of time; (3) 
citizens would have no ability to determine how their data is being used; and (4) there would be 
no independent agency to oversee the government’s program.  Francesca Bignami, European 
Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of Anti-Terrorism Data-Mining, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 609, 649-62 (2007). 
 177. It has been stated that evaluating the NSA call database in other countries is important 
because “it could undermine transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism.  Some 
European laws forbid the transfer of public security and law enforcement data to countries 
without adequate privacy protection.”  Posting by Francesca Bignami to Concurring Opinions, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/05/the_nsa_phone_c.html (May 29, 2006, 
03:51 EST). 
 178. The purpose of this part is to use the facts from the NSA call database in the United 
States as the foundation for the international analysis in Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Australia.  Thus, all the facts from the background found in Part I of this Note are assumed. 
 179. Privacy International, About Privacy International, http://www.privacyinternational.org 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2007) (stating that “Privacy International . . . is a human rights group 
formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance and privacy invasions by governments and 
corporations”). 
 180. Privacy International, Leading Surveillance Societies in the EU and the World, Feb. 11, 
2006, http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-545269. 
 181. Id. 
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that other countries strike between national security and privacy 
rights.182 
A. Canada 
1. Obtaining Phone Records.183  In 2001, Canada enacted the 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA)184 to protect an individual’s privacy interests and to 
prevent “secret information gathering practices.”185  Specifically, § 
7(3) of PIPEDA prevents personal information,186 such as phone 
records, from being disclosed by a telecommunication provider 
without consent, subpoena, warrant, or court order.187  However, the 
national security clause of PIPEDA allows disclosure to the 
government without the individual’s consent when the government 
has “identified its [1] lawful authority to obtain the information and 
 . . . (i) it suspects that the information [2] relates to national 
security.”188 
PIPEDA does not define “lawful authority” or what authority is 
necessary for “obtaining and possessing the information.”189  
However, an Ontario court has recently attempted to interpret 
“lawful authority.”190  In that case, the police requested an internet 
subscriber’s information from Bell Canada under PIPEDA,191 citing 
 
 182. The international discussion does not address the possibly higher level of privacy 
imposed by the various states or provinces’ statutes or common-law privacy within each country.  
Moreover, this part does not discuss possible defenses available to each country’s government. 
 183. Currently, Canada has proposed federal legislation called The Modernization of 
Investigative Techniques Act (MITA).  Canadian Security, Do You Know Where Your Data is 
Stored?,  http://www.canadiansecuritymag.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id 
=245&Itemid=5 (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).  MITA “will permit law enforcement to request any 
information about a subscriber from a communications provider, without requiring judicial 
authorization.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 184. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C., ch.5 (Can.) 
[hereinafter PIPEDA]. 
 185. Arthur J. Cockfield, Who Watches the Watchers? A Law and Technology Perspective on 
Government and Private Sector Surveillance, 29 QUEEN’S L.J. 364, 405 (2003). 
 186. Section 2 of PIPEDA defines “personal information” as “information about an 
identifiable individual.”  PIPEDA § 2. 
 187. Jonathon Gatehouse, You are Exposed, MACLEANS.CA, Nov. 21, 2005, 
http://www.macleans.ca/canada/national/article.jsp?content=20051121_115779_115779. 
 188. PIPEDA § 7(3)(cl.1) (emphasis added). 
 189. In re S.C., [2006] O.J. No. 3754 (Ont.). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. 
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an ongoing investigation as its authority for the information.192  Based 
on this authority, Bell Canada provided the information without a 
warrant.193  The court held that an ongoing criminal investigation does 
not constitute “lawful authority,” and that a warrant was necessary to 
obtain the subscriber information under PIPEDA because the 
individual held a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.194 
This case indicates that the government must have more than a 
mere suspicion of wrongdoing before it is acting with the requisite 
“lawful authority.”  Here, it is doubtful that the government has met 
the “lawful authority” burden, as it will not know until after the 
records are mined or searched whether they are relevant to any 
wrongdoing.195  If collection was allowed, it would be based on 
nothing more than a “fishing expedition.”  While it is true that call 
records, unlike the subscriber information, do not implicate the same 
expectation of privacy, it is arguable that a person does have at least 
some expectation of privacy in records disclosed to third parties, as 
will be discussed. 
Besides the lawful authority requirement, the national security 
clause also requires the government to “suspect[] that the information 
[obtained] relates to national security.”196 National security is difficult 
to define and the definition is not found within PIPEDA;197 however, 
a Supreme Court of Canada decision198 in 2002 may be read “as . . . 
[signaling] a limited role for the courts in policing the exercise of 
executive branch” in determining what constitutes national security.199  
Notwithstanding this possible limited role by courts, it is unlikely the 
government had enough suspicion as required by the national security 
clause to justify the acquisition of phone records. 
Any suspicion likely requires some investigation by the 
government to determine whether the information relates to national 
 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Letter from Electronic Frontier to Lawful Access Consultation (Dec. 17, 2002) 
(available at http://www.efc.ca/pages/surveillance/lawful.doc). 
 196. PIPEDA, 2000 S.C., ch.5 § 7(3)(cl.1) (emphasis added). 
 197. Craig Forcese, Through a Glass Darkly: The Role and Review of “National Security” 
Concepts in Canadian Law, 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 963 (2006) (stating that “national security is 
not defined in any of the other privacy-limiting statutes”). 
 198. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3. 
 199. Forcese, supra note 197. 
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security.200  This is necessary to ensure that a person’s privacy is 
protected and that the government is not arbitrarily obtaining the 
information without some justification.  Further, this suspicion 
requirement also protects a person from the stigma attached to being 
mistakenly labeled a national security suspect.  Thus, because the 
request for call records would not be predicated on any suspicion,201 
there would be no nexus to national security justifying the request. 
In addition to PIPEDA, the Canadian Privacy Act (CPA) 
requires that the government minimize the collection of personal 
information202 and have a demonstrable need for it.203  CPA is similar 
to PIPEDA, except that it is concerned with government entities as 
opposed to private ones.  Section 4 of the CPA provides that personal 
information should not be collected except when it relates to a 
government program;204 § 5(1), in contrast, requires that information 
be collected, if possible, directly from the person.205  Thus, for similar 
reasons discussed under PIPEDA, and the fact that the data 
collection would not be minimized, the government could not feasibly 
collect call records from the phone providers. 
2. Datamining the Call Records.  The next issue is whether 
datamining the call records would violate § 8 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter), which states that a person has 
a right to be protected against “unreasonable search and seizure.”206  
The analysis under § 8, like that under the Fourth Amendment, is 
divided into two prongs: first, does the person have a reasonable 
 
 200. In Re Ontario Power Generation Inc. and Society of Energy Prof’ls, [2004] C.L.A.S.J. 
9606 para. 28 (Ont.) (holding that the information required by the Canadian Nuclear Safety 
Commission was “predicated upon the need to do so for national security reasons”). 
 201. See background discussion supra Part I. 
 202. Section 2 defines personal information as “information about an identifiable 
individual.”  Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Privacy Act]. 
 203. News Release, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Privacy Commissioner 
releases finding on video surveillance by RCMP in Kelowna (Oct. 4, 2001) (available at 
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr-c/02_05_b_011004_e.asp). 
 204. Canadian Privacy Act § 4. 
 205. Id.  Section 8(2) provides numerous exceptions for when an agency can disclose (not 
collect) personal information to another government agency.  This section focuses on whether 
the Canadian government could collect the personal information in the first instance from the 
telecommunications provider and not whether it could obtain the data from some other 
government agency.  See id. § 8(2). 
 206. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, para. 8, 
being Sched. B to the  Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). 
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expectation of privacy in his or her phone records; 207 and second, is 
datamining those phone records reasonable. 208 
a. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.  The first prong 
potentially contains a number of factors that are relevant in 
determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his or her phone records.209  First, it is relevant whether the 
information was disclosed to a third-party.210  Unlike American law, 
where the Supreme Court has held that a person does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in any records disclosed to a third-
party,211 the “Charter jurisprudence acknowledges the persistence of 
constitutionally protected interests in information disclosed to third 
parties.”212  For example, a person in Canada has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information provided to a physician and 
information provided to a third-party regarding a sexual assault.213  
Thus, in contrast with American law, under Canadian law, a privacy 
expectation is not automatically lost when information is disclosed to 
a third-party custodian.214 
A second factor is the place where the search occurred and the 
technology used in the search.215  The Canadian Supreme Court has 
suggested that government searching of third-party records is not as 
constitutionally protected as the searching of a person’s home.216  This 
may be true, but it does not necessarily follow that individuals have 
no expectation of privacy in their records.217  Moreover, the place of 
the search is not constitutionally determinative because § 8 “protects 
people, not places.”218  As for the technology used in the search, the 
ability of datamining programs to search vast quantities of data in 
minutes is constitutionally problematic. 
 
 207. See Wayne N. Renke, Who Controls the Past Now Controls the Future: Counter-
Terrorism, Data Mining and Privacy, 43 ALBERTA L. REV. 779, 800 (2006). 
 208. See id at 810. 
 209. Id. at 800-01. 
 210. Id. at 803. 
 211. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
742 (1979). 
 212. Renke, supra note 207, at 803. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. See id. at 806-07, 809. 
 216. Id. at 806 (citing R v. Plant, [1993] S.C.R. 281, 295). 
 217. Id. at 807. 
 218. Id. 
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A third factor in the reasonable privacy expectation calculus is 
the individual’s conduct.219  This factor requires determining the 
context220 or reason for disclosure by the individual.  After a call is 
made, phone providers automatically create call records.221  However, 
“[m]ost Canadians consider their call records privileged 
information”222 and thus do not believe they are making any public 
disclosure when a call is placed.  Accordingly, the acquisition of call 
records by the government from the phone providers is likely an 
involuntary disclosure. 
Fourth, the nature of the information may be another important 
factor.223  Generally, the “greater the relevance of the information to 
the ‘biographical core’ of the individual, to the ‘intimate details’ of 
the individual’s life . . . the stronger the expectation of privacy.”224  
Although call records do not appear to identify biographical core 
information, the Canadian Criminal Code “establishes a procedure 
for the issuance of a warrant to install a device and record this 
information.”225  Thus, the Criminal Code provision is evidence that 
call records have some constitutional value. 
The final factor is the relationship between the custodian 
(government or phone provider) and the individual.226  Both PIPEDA 
and the CPA statutorily require that the custodian protect private 
information such as call records.227  Based on these statutes, it is likely 
that a person would reasonably rely on them to protect his privacy 
expectations. 
b. Is Datamining the Call Records Reasonable?  In analyzing 
the second prong, whether datamining is reasonable, there are five 
potentially relevant factors to consider.  The first is the purpose of the 
datamining.228  Here, the purpose of the mining would be to prevent 
terrorist acts, which is unquantifiably important.  Datamining without 
any purpose other than to protect the monolithic category of 
“national security” should not suffice.  Response to terrorism 
 
 219. Id. at 801. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Diamond & Cauley, supra note 5. 
 222. Gatehouse, supra note 187. 
 223. Renke, supra note 207, at 803-04. 
 224. Id. at 803; R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 492.2 (1985). 
 225. Renke, supra note 207, at 804. 
 226. See id. at 804-06. 
 227. Id. at 804-05. 
 228. See id. at 811-12. 
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sometimes means that the government must move quickly, such as in 
an emergency,229 but when an emergency exists, the constitutional 
protections of the Charter should not be sacrificed. 
The second factor looks at whether the datamining is effective.230  
The individuals in the call database were not selected based on an 
investigation.  Thus, many false positives are likely to result, 
especially considering the size of the database, which involves 
millions of people.  Moreover, the patterns that emerge from the 
mining depend on the suspect maintaining a similar history, but “as 
adversaries change strategy, their patterns of past behavior fail to 
provide clues to future activities.”231  Finally, the patterns that do 
emerge may be questionable for the simple reason that the dataset 
supporting the pattern is not large enough (lack of suspects) to make 
any accurate statistical predictions.232 
A third factor in the reasonableness calculus is the 
intrusiveness233 of mining the data.  The Canadian Supreme Court has 
stated that the scope of invasion can make a search unreasonable, 
especially when the people searched are not under any 
investigation.234  The American call database, however, would likely 
involve millions of targets and a person’s call records being 
repeatedly searched. 
In addition to the purpose, effectiveness, and intrusiveness of 
datamining, another factor to consider is whether there is any 
oversight of the datamining.235  Oversight aids in eliminating any 
potential distrust between the people searched and the government.236  
As discussed previously, the NSA call database lacks any appearance 
of oversight, as the program was created secretly and without the 
input from the people’s representatives.237  Thus, Canadians would 
probably distrust datamining more than if they were informed about 
the data searching before it occurred.  It could be argued that giving 
notice to people would completely destroy the national security 
 
 229. See id. 
 230. Id. at 816-17. 
 231. Data mining, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_mining (last visited Feb. 
14, 2007). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Renke, supra note 207, at 813-14. 
 234. Id. at 813 (citing  R v. Thompson, [1990]  S.C.R. 1111, 1143-44). 
 235. Id. at 820. 
 236. See id. 
 237. Page, NSA Secret Database, supra note 2. 
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purpose, as possible terrorists would alter their plans.  However, this 
argument ignores that there are alternative ways to prevent tipping 
off the potential terrorists, but at the same time providing the 
requisite notice.  For instance, the government could limit the call 
records to known investigations of terrorist suspects or call records 
for which the government has a warrant. 
The final consideration in determining the reasonableness of the 
search is the potential misuse of the data.238  It is possible that one 
agency could make the call database available to other agencies,239 
thereby allowing them to obtain call records about a person without 
any investigation or probable cause.  Moreover, hackers could 
penetrate the government’s security and consequently share that 
information almost instantly with the world.240  The size of the 
database makes these threats even more serious. 
B. United Kingdom 
1. Obtaining Phone Records.  In December of 2001, the British 
Parliament approved the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
(ATCSA).241  ATCSA allows the government to request that 
communication providers retain their data242 for national security 
purposes or for preventing crimes that relate to national security.243  
In addition to ATCSA, the United Kingdom has also enacted the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), which controls “the 
acquisition and disclosure of data relating to communications.”244  
Specifically, under § 22(2) of RIPA, a number of government groups 
can access personal information outside of national security for such 
things as the collection of taxes.245 
 
 238. Renke, supra note 207, at 818-19. 
 239. See id. at 819. 
 240. See id. at 819-20. 
 241. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 (U.K.) [hereinafter ATCSA];  
see also PRIVACY INT’L, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2005, at 661, 726 (2005), available at 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2005/PHR2005swed-ven.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
 242. Whether the retention is illegal under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) is beyond the scope of this Note.  See Hosein et al., supra note 142 (arguing that 
data retention would be illegal because it would interfere with Article 8 of ECHR—“the right to 
respect for his or her private life”—by accumulating a large amount of private data). 
 243. ATCSA, pt. 11; PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 241, at 726. 
 244. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (U.K.) [hereinafter RIPA]. 
 245. Ben Emmerson, Q.C. & Helen Mountfield, Counsel to the Info. Comm’r, Anti-
Terrorism, Crime And Security Act 2001 Retention And Disclosure Of Communications Data 
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As a result of both ATCSA and RIPA, data can be retained for 
national security purposes, but can be accessed by a wide variety of 
public groups for “purposes . . . which extend substantially beyond 
issues concerning national security.”246  In fact, the Home Office247 
stated in 2002 that under RIPA more than “1,000 different 
government departments including local authorities, health, 
environmental, trade departments and many other public authorities” 
had access to the communications data.248 
Through these acts, the British government has already created 
something like the call database.  The telecommunication providers 
can be required to retain the call records and many governmental 
units have access to them.  Thus, the acquisition of call records by the 
government would likely be legal under British law. 
2. Datamining the Call Records.  It has been claimed by some 
commentators that even though the United Kingdom’s anti-terrorism 
legislation does not address datamining, it “is already widely used in 
the United Kingdom to combat terrorism.” 249  Further, it would seem 
incongruent to have broad laws enabling the retention of data, but 
not allowing the mining of that data.  Thus, a final question that needs 
to be addressed is whether the U.K. government could permissibly 
search the call records. 
Like many other European Countries, the United Kingdom has 
adopted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).250  
 
Summary Of Counsels’ Advice, para. 4, http://www.privacyinternational.org/countries/uk/ 
surveillance/ic-terror-opinion.htm [hereinafter Counsels’ Advice] (stating that the RIPA 
“permits a range of public authorities to obtain access to such communications data for a wide 
variety of public interest purposes . . . which extend substantially beyond issues concerning 
national security”).  Section 22(2) of the RIPA lists eight possible reasons for the government to 
obtain communication data.  RIPA § 22(2). 
 246. Counsels’ Advice, supra note 245. 
 247. The Home Office is “responsible for keeping the UK safe from any threat to . . . 
national security . . . [by working] with the police and security agencies.”  Home Office, 
Security, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2007). 
 248. PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 241, at 726. 
 249. John Yoo, Catching Terrorists: The British System versus the U.S. System, AM. INST. 
FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., Sept. 18, 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24903/ 
pub_detail.asp; see generally Kendra Gilbert, Gregg: Fight Terrorism like the British, THE 
UNION LEADER (N.H.), Sept. 15, 2006, at A7 (stating that some believe “the U.S. government 
[should] emulate Britain’s more lenient restrictions on data mining”) (emphasis added). 
 250. See generally DANIEL C. PREFONTAINE, THE INT’L CTR. FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY, IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN ENFORCING THE LAW AND RESPECTING 
THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 5 (2001), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/ 
05__MACARTHUR.DOC 10/4/2007  9:55:02 AM 
472 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:441 
Under Article 8(1), “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his 
private . . . .life.”251  This has been read as the right to be free from 
government interference except when the government’s interference 
is “in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security.”252 
The first question is whether the search of call records amounts 
to an interference requiring the government to justify its actions.  
Article 8’s reference to private life means that a person has a right to 
seek and form relationships with other individuals.253  Searching call 
records could chill the use of phones to communicate with others and 
accordingly would interfere with the private life protected by Article 
8.254  It could be argued that no interference exists because the data 
searched is limited to non-content communications data.255  However, 
this argument ignores that the “European Court of Human Rights has 
repeatedly found the recording of numbers [dialed] from 
conventional telephones to constitute an interference with private 
life.” 256  Moreover, after considering the scope of the call database, 
the interference is significant, even conceding that only non-content 
information is being searched. 
Although there may be interference, the government may not 
have violated Article 8 if the interference is “in accordance with the 
law . . . and necessary in a democratic society.”257  In 2000, the 
European Commission on Human Rights (the precursor to the 
European Court of Human Rights), in Khan v. United Kingdom,258 
discussed the meaning of “in accordance with law.”  In Khan, the 
court stated: 
 
Reports/International_Standards.pdf.  In 1998, the U.K. Parliament adopted The Human Rights 
Act, which contains three points regarding the ECHR: (1) the government cannot violate 
Convention rights unless, through an Act of Parliament, it had no choice; (2) U.K. legislation 
should be interpreted to fit within the ECHR; (3) individuals can seek a remedy from a U.K. 
court instead of using the European Court of Human Rights.  Dep’t for Constitutional Affairs, 
General Information on the Human Rights Act 1998, http://www.dca.gov.uk/peoples-
rights/human-rights/faqs.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). 
 251. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8(1), 
Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 252. Id. art. 8(2). 
 253. See Hosein et al., supra note 142. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. ECHR, supra note 251, art. 8(2). 
 258. App. No. 35394/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45 (2001) (Commission Report). 
05__MACARTHUR.DOC 10/4/2007  9:55:02 AM 
2007] THE NSA PHONE CALL DATABASE 473 
[T]he phrase “in accordance with the law” not only requires 
compliance with domestic law but relates to the quality of that 
law . . . the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give 
individuals an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which 
and the conditions on which public authorities are entitled to resort 
to such covert measures.259 
Khan requires the existence of a domestic law that sanctions the 
interference and a law that allows individuals to foresee when the 
government can interfere in their private lives.260  This foreseeability 
function permits individuals to adjust or alter their conduct to avoid 
the possible interference.261  Without this notice, for example, an 
individual may be penalized for previously legal conduct.  Even if the 
United Kingdom enacted laws that authorized datamining to prevent 
terrorism, the laws would still have to be sufficiently public to put the 
citizens on notice, which did not happen based on the alleged facts 
from the NSA call database.  Thus, the United Kingdom’s action of 
datamining would likely not be “in accordance with the law.” 
Even though the government’s datamining is not “in accordance 
with the law,” it is still valuable to discuss whether the datamining “is 
necessary in a democratic society.”  The European Court on Human 
Rights has interpreted this phrase to mean that the interference has 
to be proportionate (or no more than necessary) to a “legitimate aim 
pursued” and must “correspond to a pressing social need.”262 
In considering how the call database would fare under U.K. law, 
the proportionality requirement is not met because the United 
Kingdom has no mechanisms in place to limit the interference.  First, 
the government did not restrict its datamining to the call records of 
suspected terrorists.  Instead, the government mined the records of 
individuals merely because they made a domestic phone call.  Second, 
if the government does not destroy the call records after mining, then 
it would be continually interfering with a person’s life263 because the 
 
 259. Id. at para. 26 (emphasis added); see generally Alisdair A. Gillespie, The Legal Use of 
Participating Informers, WEB J. OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2000), http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/ 
2000/issue5/gillespie5.html. 
 260. Khan, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 45, para. 26. 
 261. Hosein et al., supra note 142. 
 262. Id.  See also, e.g., Case C-441/02, Comm’n v. Germany, 2006 E.C.R. I-03449 para. 109 
(The European Court of Justice stated that for something to be “necessary in a democratic 
society,” it must be “justified by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.”); Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. I-8667. 
 263. In Re S. v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [2004] UKHL 39 (“The general tenor 
of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court of Human Rights) and 
European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) is that the retention, keeping or 
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retention of data would allow any government agency to perform 
surveillance at will.264  Finally, one person’s records may be searched 
multiple times without any oversight procedures to ensure the search 
is limited.  Accordingly, it is unlikely that datamining by the U.K. 
government “is necessary in a democratic society.” 
In addition to the ECHR, there is a British domestic law that 
protects data processing called the Data Protection Act.265  This Act 
applies to personal data266 processing done by government and private 
organizations. 267  The Act contains eight principles illustrating how 
personal data should be processed.268  The Act, however, is not 
considered effective because “[t]here are many problems with 
enforcing rules on access to information, especially relating to 
computer technologies.”269  Moreover, a recent Court of Appeals 
decision has narrowed the meaning of “personal information” and 
thus restricted the possible privacy protections under the Act.270  It is 
therefore likely that the ECHR rather than the domestic law provides 
more protection against unlawful datamining. 
 
storage of private information by state institutions is an interference with art. 8(1) rights.”); see 
also Hosein et al., supra note 142. 
 264. See id. (stating “that citizens should have notice of the circumstances in which the State 
may conduct surveillance, so that they can regulate their behaviour to avoid unwanted 
intrusions”). 
 265. Data Protection Act, 1998 (U.K.) [hereinafter DPA]; PRIVACY INT’L, UNITED 
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 2003, available at 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/countries/unitedkingdom.htm [hereinafter 
UNITED KINGDOM]; Spy Blog, RFID Data Protection Guidance from the Information 
Commissioner, http://p10.hostingprod.com/@spyblog.org.uk/blog/2006/09/rfid_data_protection_ 
guidance.html (Sept. 28, 2006, 11:57 AM) (stating that “[t]he Data Protection Act 1998 concerns 
the processing of personal data”). 
 266. DPA pt. 1, § 1 (defining “personal data,” in part, as “data which relate to a living 
individual who can be identified . . . from those data”). 
 267. UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 265. 
 268. See Margaret Smith, The Privacy of Personal Information and Electronic Commerce—
Recent Developments, GOV’T OF CAN. PUBLICATIONS, May 31, 2000, available at http://dsp-
psd.communication.gc.ca/Pilot/LoPBdP/BP/prb0005-e.htm. 
 269. UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 265 (emphasis added); Anne Lenoir, Privacy and Data 
Protection Act 2007, BBC ACTION NETWORK, Dec. 19, 2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/ 
actionnetwork/A4446038 (arguing the Data Protection Act of 1998 does not protect the right of 
privacy). 
 270. Data protection case goes to the House of Lords, OUT-LAW NEWS, June 16, 2005, 
http://www.out-law.com/page-5820; Jason Lysandrides, UK Government Given Formal Warning 
by Commission, LAWDIT READING ROOM, http://www.lawdit.co.uk/reading_room/room/ 
view_article.asp?name=../articles/Privacy%20developments%20-%20draftv2.htm (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2007) (stating the European Commission issued a formal warning to the U.K. 
government because “the narrow interpretation given . . . of personal data . . . [does] not 
adequately reflect the broader intention of the [European Union]”). 
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C. Australia 
1. Obtaining Phone Records.  In 1997, Australia enacted the 
Telecommunications Act, which “contains a number of provisions 
dealing with the privacy of personal information held by” providers.271  
Under Part 13 of that Act, it is presumed that a consumer’s phone 
records are confidential unless an exception applies.272  One such 
exception allows disclosure to an Australian Security Intelligence 
Organization (ASIO) agent when it is authorized “in writing by the 
Director-General of Security” (DGS) and the disclosure relates to the 
ASIO functions.273  The DGS could potentially authorize the 
telecommunication providers to disclose millions of call records.  
However, it is unlikely that the DGS would make such certification 
equivalent to the American database, because it is doubtful that such 
a broad request would relate to ASIO functions.274 
Even without the ASIO exception, it may still be possible for the 
Australian government to obtain the call records through the 
Telecommunications Act by leveraging records already obtained 
through other agencies.275  The Act permits disclosure to the 
government for the “enforcement of the criminal law.”276  In 2001, 
approximately 750,000 call records were released to governmental 
units,277 and in 1999-2000 almost one million disclosures of records 
 
 271. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner, http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/ 
telecom/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007). 
 272. PRIVACY INT’L, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (2003), http://www.privacy 
international.org/survey/phr2003/countries/australia.htm (stating that “[t]he Telecommunications Act 
1997 contains a detailed list of ‘exceptions’ from a basic presumption of confidentiality of customer 
records”).  Part 13 § 276(1)(a) of the 1997 Telecommunications Act prohibits disclosure of 
information that relates to the communication substance unless an exception applies.  
Telecommunications Act, 1997, pt. 13, § 276(1)(a) (Austl.).  Because call records contain data that 
relates to the substance of the communication such as where the call was made, those records would 
likely qualify as information that could not be disclosed without an exception. 
 273. Telecommunications Act, pt. 13, § 283. 
 274. But see infra note 277 (discussing that a substantial number of call records have been 
disclosed to the ASIO). 
 275. This analysis assumes that the other agencies have kept a repository or database of call 
records once obtained from the telecommunication provider and have not erased these records. 
 276. Telecommunications Act, pt. 13, § 282. 
 277. Velcro, supra note 22; see Protection of Communications: Telecommunications Act 1997 
(C’th), ELECTRONIC FRONTIERS AUSTL., Oct. 12, 2006, http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/ 
Privacy/ta.html (stating that “[t]he Australian Communications Authority has confirmed that 
telecommunications companies . . . [disclosed] information to law-enforcement and other 
government agencies 998,548 times in 1999-2000. . . .  The extraordinary access to phone records 
does not include information given to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, which is 
believed to be substantial and which the agency is not obliged to disclose.  The information 
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were made under the Act.278  Moreover, any agency that gives call 
records or personal information to an intelligence agency would be 
exempt from the requirements of the Federal Privacy Act,279 which 
limits the collection of personal information by the government.280  
Thus, the police and other agencies could obtain the call records and 
then transfer those records to an intelligence agency in a manner 
similar to the FBI acquiring and transferring call records to the NSA. 
In addition to the Telecommunications Act of 1997, the amended 
2001 Federal Privacy Act limits the government’s ability to acquire 
call records.281  This Act includes National Privacy Principles (NPP) 282 
and Information Privacy Principles (IPP),283 but unlike the NPPs, 
which apply to private organizations, the IPPs apply to government 
agencies.284  Specifically, NPP 2 states that a telecommunication 
 
revealed included telephone accounts, numbers dialled, the time calls were made and their 
duration, and use of the Internet.  These disclosures were made at a rate of more than 19,000 a 
week, or nearly 4000 on any working day.”) (emphasis added). 
 278. Inquiry into The Law Enforcement Implications of New Technology, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIERS AUSTL., Apr. 19, 2001, http://www.efa.org.au/Publish/ncasub.html. 
 279. Part 2, § 7(1) of the Privacy Act states that a “record that has originated with, or has 
been received from . . . an intelligence agency” is exempt from the Privacy Act.  Privacy Act, 
1988, as amended 2006, pt. 2, § 7(1) (Austl.); see Roger Clark, The Australian Privacy Act 1988 
as an Implementation of the OECD Data Protection Guidelines, THE AUSTL. NAT’L U., June 25, 
1989, available at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/PActOECD.html (stating 
that § 7(1) has “the effect that any record whatsoever can be permanently removed from the 
individual’s sight by passing the data to an intelligence agency for its consideration and return.  
Any material that an agency wishes to keep from a data subject can therefore be protected.”). 
 280. Matthew Kohel, Note, The Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000: The 
Australian Government’s Substandard Attempt to Allay Privacy Concerns and Regulate Internet 
Privacy in the Private Sector, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 703, 703-04 (2002) (stating that “[t]he 
Privacy Act was Australia’s attempt to regulate how  personal information is collected, 
transferred and disposed of in the public sector”). 
 281. It is true that the Telecommunications Act of 1997 and the Amended Privacy Act of 
2001 would seem to overlap, however, the “[c]overage of the National Privacy Principles in the 
Privacy legislation is broader than Part 13 of the Telecommunications Act.”  Holly Raiche, 
Telecommunications Privacy—The Interaction of the Privacy and Telecommunications 
Regulatory Systems, THE NEW AUSTL. PRIVACY LANDSCAPE CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 
SEMINAR (Mar. 14, 2001) available at http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/PrivLRes/2001/4.html. 
 282. Office of Legislative Drafting, Extracted from the Privacy Act 1988, 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/npps01.pdf (last visited June 14, 2007) [hereinafter 
National Privacy Principles]. 
 283. The Information Privacy Principles are a part of the 1988 Privacy Act.  Privacy Act, 
1988 (Austl.) [hereinafter Information Privacy Principles]. 
 284. See The Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Federal Privacy Law, 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/act/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2007) (stating that in Australia, 
“[t]he Federal Privacy Act contains eleven Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) which apply to 
Commonwealth and ACT government agencies.  It also has ten National Privacy Principles 
(NPPs) which apply to parts of the private sector and all health service providers.”).  Therefore, 
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provider “must not . . . disclose personal information285 about an 
individual for a purpose (the secondary purpose) other than the 
primary purpose of collection” unless an exception applies.286 
The primary purpose of the collection of the call records by the 
telecommunication providers will probably be for billing even though 
other purposes may be listed in the standard phone contract.  It is 
highly unlikely that phone providers collect call records primarily for 
national security.  Thus, the phone providers could not disclose 
personal information unless it was for billing purposes. 
Although NPP 2 prohibits disclosure of call records, it still allows 
disclosure for a secondary purpose if an exception applies.  It is 
unlikely that the phone providers could have a secondary purpose 
because “there must be a strong[] connection between the . . . 
disclosure and the primary purpose for collection.”287  A national 
security purpose would not have a strong connection to billing and 
therefore not qualify as a secondary purpose. 
Even assuming that the phone providers had an arguable 
secondary purpose, none of the exceptions list in NPP 2.1(a)-(h) 
 
because the Federal Privacy Act “does not regulate state or territory agencies, except for the 
ACT,” any analysis of the call database would have to be done under each state’s privacy laws, 
which is beyond the scope of this Note.  Office of Privacy Commissioner, State & Territory 
Privacy Laws, http://www.privacy.gov.au/privacy_rights/laws/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 
2007). 
 285. Personal information is defined as “an opinion (including information or an opinion 
forming part of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or 
not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the 
information or opinion.”  Privacy Act, 1988, as amended 2006, pt. 2, §6(1) (Austl.).  Thus, call 
records would likely fit within the definition as a person’s identity can be reasonably ascertained 
from person’s phone number by matching that number to a name in the phone book.  See Sarah 
Harrison, The Privacy Amendments—What Do They Mean for General Insurance Claims?, 2002 
INS. L.J. (Austl.) 13 n.18 (July 26, 2002) (defining personal information as “a person’s name, 
address, phone number, email address, birth date, marital information etc.”) (emphasis added). 
 286. National Privacy Principles Act, supra note 282, § 2.1.  The exceptions are found under 
2.1 and include (a) where “the secondary purpose [of disclosure] is related to the primary 
purpose of collection and . . .  the individual would reasonably expect the organization to . . . 
disclose the information for the secondary purpose”; (b) consent by a person; (c) the person’s 
non-sensitive information will be used for direct marketing and five other conditions are met; 
(d) the person’s health information is required for research related to public safety and three 
other conditions are met; (e) disclosure is necessary to protect an imminent threat to a person’s 
safety, health, or life or “a serious threat to public health or public safety”; (ee) genetic 
information obtain through providing health service and three other conditions are met; (f) 
organization believes that unlawful activity is occurring and discloses the personal information 
for an investigation; (g) authorized by law; (h) disclosure is necessary for an enforcement body 
such as law enforcement or public revenue protection.  Id. § 2.1(a)-(h). 
 287. Office of the Privacy Comm’r, Guidelines to the National Privacy Principles, Sept. 
2001, http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/nppgl_01.html [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
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likely applies.288  The only exceptions likely to apply are that the 
disclosure is necessary to prevent an imminent or serious threat289 or is 
necessary for an enforcement body.290  The threat exception is not 
applicable because most, if not all, the records were collected to 
prevent possible future threats, and this exception allows disclosure in 
emergency situations only.291  Under the enforcement body exception, 
disclosure is permitted to prevent or investigate a criminal offense,292 
which is “an act or practice that is prohibited by criminal law at 
Commonwealth or State and Territory level.”293  Thus, disclosure of 
call records would not be permitted because there is no criminal act. 
Notwithstanding the limitation imposed on the 
telecommunication providers through the NPPs, the government 
could still not acquire the call records based on the IPPs.  Under IPP 
1, the government can only collect personal information lawfully, and 
the collection has to be related to the government’s purpose.294  
Moreover, IPP 3 states that when the government requests personal 
information, the information must be relevant to the agency’s reason 
for collecting it.295  If the government collected numerous call records, 
it would violate IPP1 for two reasons.  First, it would be acting 
without a warrant and therefore unlawfully.  Second, any collected 
call records would not have the necessary connection to terrorism and 
therefore fail to serve the government’s terrorist prevention purpose. 
2. Datamining the Call Records.  Australia’s federal 
constitution does not include provisions relating to privacy.296  In fact, 
 
 288. It is unlikely a person consents to datamining for national security purposes through 
phone contracts and the direct marketing, unlawful activity, authorized by law, health, and 
genetic exceptions are not applicable. 
 289. National Privacy Principles Act, supra note 282, § 2.1(e). 
 290. Id. § 2.1(h)(i)-(v). 
 291. Guidelines, supra note 287. 
 292. National Privacy Principles Act, supra note 282, § 2.1(h)(i). 
 293. INFORMATION SHEET 7—2001 Unlawful Activity and Law Enforcement, OFFICE 
OF THE PRIVACY COMM’R (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/ 
publications/IS7_01.doc. 
 294. Plain English Guidelines to Information Privacy: Principles 1- 3, OFFICE OF THE 
PRIVACY COMM’R, 2 (1994), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/HRC_ 
PRIVACY_PUBLICATION.word_file.p6_4_14.4.doc. 
 295. Id. at 4. 
 296. LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMM., THE REAL BIG BROTHER: 
INQUIRY INTO THE PRIVACY ACT 1988, at 10 (2005) available at http://www.aph.gov.au/ 
senate/committee/legcon_ctte/privacy/report/report.pdf 
(stating that “[t]he Australian Constitution does not expressly protect privacy”). 
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Australia currently does not have a bill of rights.297  Australians must 
therefore turn to other sources of law, such as international 
agreements298 or domestic privacy statutes, for protection against 
interference with their private life. 
Australia ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1980.299  Article 17 of ICCPR provides 
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy . . . [and] [e]veryone has the right to the protection of 
the law against such interference.”300  Moreover, “any [arbitrary] 
interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and 
be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.” 301 
Based in part on the ICCPR, the Australian government, in 1980, 
adopted a domestic Federal Privacy Act, discussed above, to protect 
against unlawful or arbitrary interference with privacy.302  In 
particular, IPP 9 states that personal information can only be used by 
an agency “for a purpose to which the information is relevant.”303  
 
 297. James Allan & Grant Huscroft, Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? Rights 
Internationalism in American Courts, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 16 (2006). 
 298. LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENCES COMM., supra note 296, at 8 (stating that 
“[t]here are several key sources of international law and standards relevant to privacy 
protection in Australia.  In particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) recognises the right to privacy in Article 17.”); See George Williams, Bali, Terrorism 
& Australia: The Rule of Law and Human Rights in Australia after Bali, AUSTL. POL’Y ONLINE, 
Nov. 19, 2002, http://www.apo.org.au/webboard/results.chtml?filename_num=00172 (stating that 
“the absence of a domestic Bill of Rights means that Australians turn to international law”); 
 299. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 300. Id. art. 17.  In addition to the ICCPR, Australia also ratified the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A 
(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).  The UDHR in Article 12 contains a similar provision as 
ICCPR’s Article 17 providing that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy . . . .  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference.”  Id. 
art. 12. 
 301. Human Rights Comm., Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, 
paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Commc’n No. 488/1992, ¶ 8.3, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Mar. 31, 1994). 
 302. Chris Cowper, Successful Complaints to the Federal Privacy Commissioner,  BAKER & 
MCKENZIE CYBERSPACE L. & POL’Y CTR. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., Dec. 4, 2003, 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/news/speeches/sp22_03.doc (stating that “the Privacy Act was . . . a 
response to Australia’s commitment as a party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Right to ‘adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to gives effect to the 
right of persons not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, 
home, family or correspondence’”). 
 303. Plain English Guidelines to Information Privacy: Principles 8-11, OFFICE OF THE 
PRIVACY COMM’R 4 (1996), available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/ipp8_11.doc 
(stating that use includes “any accessing by an agency of personal information” such as 
searching records). 
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Additionally, IPP 10.1 states that personal information obtained by 
an agency can only be used for a particular purpose unless one of the 
five exceptions applies.304  Further, that purpose must be well defined, 
that is, the agency “must know exactly why it is obtaining the 
information.”305 
Both IPP 9 and 10 and Article 17 of ICCPR would be violated if 
the government mined the call records for national security reasons.  
First, millions of call records would belong to people who are not 
terrorist suspects, thereby violating the relevance requirement in IPP 
9.  Next, the purpose would not be sufficiently well-defined or specific 
to satisfy the requirements of IPP 10.1 because it would be so broad 
as to include almost all personal information.  Moreover, none of the 
five exceptions in 10.1(a)-(e) likely apply to exempt the government 
from IPP 10.1.306 Finally, mining millions of call records would violate 
Article 17 of ICCPR, as there are less intrusive means to protect 
national security. 
CONCLUSION 
In analyzing the NSA call database under U.S. law, the first legal 
question focused on whether the NSA could legally obtain call 
records from the telecommunication providers.  If the NSA did not 
obtain a warrant, it violated FISA.  Further, an examination of the 
Pen Register Statute revealed that although the government did not 
violate the statute, the government should be liable for circumventing 
it.  Alternatively, the FBI could not obtain the call records and then 
transfer them to the NSA using a NSL.  Finally, analysis of this first 
question concluded by finding that the phone providers violated the 
1996 Telecommunications Act for voluntary disclosure of call records.  
However, the providers did not likely violate the 1986 Stored 
Communications Act because they transferred real time, as opposed 
to stored, records to the NSA. 
The next question analyzed whether datamining the call records 
violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
search and seizures.  Both Miller and Smith likely dictate that a 
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their phone 
records voluntarily given to a third-party.  However, it is conceivable 
that the Court could find that the searching technology employed by 
 
 304. Information Privacy Principles, supra note 283. 
 305. Plain English Guidelines to Information Privacy: Principles 8-11, supra note 303. 
 306. Information Privacy Principles, supra note 283. 
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the NSA requires such a privacy interest.  Through opinion polls and 
lawsuits, society seems to be indicating that it would recognize such a 
privacy interest. 
After analyzing the relevant two questions, the focus switched to 
defenses available to the government, such as the state secrets 
privilege and the President’s authority (both express and inherent).  
Under the state secrets privilege, the government would likely prevail 
because there have been no public disclosures about the call 
database.  As for the President’s authority, he lacks both express 
authority under the AUMF and inherent authority to bypass FISA. 
Finally, the call database was analyzed under Canadian, British, 
and Australian law, and it was determined that the call database 
program was likely illegal in all countries.  Canada’s PIPEDA and 
Privacy Act prevent the government from acquiring call records while 
§ 8 of the Charter might prohibit mining of those records.  The 
expansive national security legislation in the United Kingdom would 
seem to allow the collection of call records, but the ECHR would 
appear to prevent mining those records. 
In Australia, the NPPs and IPPs would likely prevent the 
Australian government from acquiring call records unless it can 
obtain those records from another agency.  Also, IPP 9 and 10 and 
Article 17 of the ICCPR would likely prohibit datamining, as its 
purpose would not be well-defined, and the call records themselves 
would not be relevant to the national security purpose. 
In sum, this Note explores a wide range of legal issues connected 
to the privacy protections from government intrusions.  In today’s 
society, this is significantly important as new technology allows the 
government to use information in new and previously unimaginable 
ways.  Thus, there needs to be protection to ensure that even when 
national security is at its pinnacle, privacy is not sacrificed without 
justification and never completely. 
